Vietnam Generation
Volume 1
Number 2 A White Man's War: Race Issues and
Vietnam

Article 4

4-1989

Project 100,000: The Great Society's Answer to
Military Manpower Needs in Vietnam
Lisa Hsiao

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.lasalle.edu/vietnamgeneration
Part of the American Studies Commons
Recommended Citation
Hsiao, Lisa (1989) "Project 100,000: The Great Society's Answer to Military Manpower Needs in Vietnam," Vietnam Generation: Vol. 1
: No. 2 , Article 4.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.lasalle.edu/vietnamgeneration/vol1/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by La Salle University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Vietnam
Generation by an authorized editor of La Salle University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact careyc@lasalle.edu.

PRojECT 100, 000 : THe G reat S o ciety ' s
A nswer to MiliTARy M anpower NeecI s iN
V ietnam
LisA H siao

iNTROduCTION
In 1966, during a speech in New York City, Secretary of
Defense Robert McNamara announced that he would lower the mental
and physical standards for admission into the Armed Services.
McNamara based his decision on government reports1 which had
studied the rejectees. He promised that the new program, “Project
100,000” (POHT), would uplift America’s “subterranean poor” and
cure them o f the “idleness, ignorance, and apathy” which marked their
lives. Proclaiming that these young men “have not had the opportunity
to earn their fair share of this nation’s abundance, but they can be
given an opportunity to return to civilian life with skills and aptitudes,”2
the Secretary predicted that men recruited under POHT would return
to the civilian world able to earn two to three times the amount that
they would have earned had they not entered the military.3
Although the original announcement of Project 100,000 did
not specifically mention the problems of black Americans, in a speech
called “Social Inequities: Urban Racial Ills,” presented to the National
Association of Educational Broadcasters, the Secretary o f Defense
claimed that POHT was created to assist black men in overcoming a
heritage of poverty and deprivation. McNamara claimed that the DOD
had the “potential for contributing to the solution of the social
problems wracking our nation.”4He described POHT as a step towards
restoring the self-respect of these men, citing high black failure rates
on the Armed Forces Qualification Test, as well as Moynihan’s theory
of the cycle of family poverty.5 An excerpt from the speech reads:
What these men badly need is a sense o f personal
achievement—a sense o f succeeding at some task—a sense
o f their own intrinsic potential.... They have grown up in an
atmosphere o f drift and discouragement. It is not simply the
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sometimes squalid ghettos o f their external environment that
has debilitated them—but an internal and more destructive
ghetto o f personal disillusionment and despair: a ghetto o f
the human spirit.6

McNamara announced that Project 100,000 would enlist or
induct 40,000 men by June of 1966. He neglected to mention General
Hershey’s declaration that escalating the war effort would require a
monthly draft call of up to 40,000 men by October 1966. Perhaps he
felt that the juxtaposition of those two pieces of information could lead
to a line of questioning which would be uncomfortable for the Johnson
Administration. In fact, his August 1966 speech gave no indication
that rising manpower needs had any relationship to the decision to
implement POHT. He also failed to point out that Congress had refused
to fund his project, and that he planned to finance it out of the DOD’s
regular budget. Instead, McNamara made four promises about the
program: New Standards Men (the term for men enlisted under POHT)
would receive the same basic training as regular soldiers and all the
special assistance they required; New Standards Men (NSM) would be
trained in skills useful in military occupations and would have access
to the best technological and military specialties; NSM would learn
self-discipline by absorbing the military system; and, NSM would
receive veterans’ benefits after their service in the Armed Forces.
Declaring that the Armed Forces had previously maintained
unreasonably high standards for admission, McNamara predicted
that POHT would enlist up to 150,000 NSM a year.
Virtually no historical research has been done on Project
100,000, and the Johnson Administration’s motives have remained
obscure. The historical works which do mention POHT seldom devote
more than a paragraph to the program, and their authors frequently
accept the administration’s explanation without probing more deeply.7
Most military, political, and social histories of the Vietnam War fail to
note Project 100,000 as a policy of historical and cultural significance.
By focusing on three areas—a short history of Project 100,000, an
overview of discriminatory politicies in the military, and a look at the
military’s treatment o f rejectees—I hope to establish some basis for
drawing conclusions about the Administration’s investment in POHT.
The information contained in this essay is based on the small
collection o f available documents on Project 100,000, and should
serve as an indication that a full scale study on the current status of
POHT veterans deserves to be pursued.
Project 100,000 represented a landmark in both American
domestic and foreign policy. The domestic policy of “helping”
underprivileged blacks provided the troops necessary to carry out US
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foreign policy in Vietnam. Moynihan’s theory that military training
and discipline could solve poor black men’s social and educational
problems gave the Johnson Administration an excuse to draft these
men and send them into combat.8 Motivated by issues of race and
racial paternalism, POHT failed in every way to benefit black Americans.
Few NSM received the promised remedial education, few improved
their post-war employment status, and many came home wounded;
many did not come home at all.
Ironically, POHT also failed to benefit the military establishment.
It provided the Armed Services with incapable, often mentally disabled
soldiers. The first page of Moynihan’s report, The Negro Family, ends
with a quote from Gunnar Myrdal’s An American Dilemma: “America
is free to choose whether the [black American] shall remain her liability
or become her opportunity.” Moynihan’s use of Myrdal is ironic, as
Myrdal would probably not have supported the choices which
Moynihan’s report urged Johnson and McNamara to make. By creating
Project 100,000, the American government made a choice Myrdal did
not envision: it exploited black Americans, using them as cannon
fodder while cloaking their betrayal in the rhetoric of advancement.
America had turned liability into opportunity—but not for the black
man.

A B rieF H istory o f PRojECT 100,000
The DOD had lofty goals for New Standards recruits. Every
branch o f the military was tpld it had to accept a certain percentage
of them in its quarterly quotas, with the Army required to take 25% of
its quota from POHT, the Marines 18%, and the Navy and A ir Force
15%-9 Most rejectees had failed the AFQT; under POHT the military
would accept them anyway, provided that they could demonstrate
over time that they had higher intellectual abilities than their test
scores indicated. The DOD also specified that the training, performance,
and achievement data for each NSM had to be updated bi-annually.10
Between October 1966andJune 1969, POHTreceived 246,000
recruits. The population of POHT men differed considerably from
regular servicemen; 50% of POHT, versus 28% o f regular servicemen,
were from southern states." The median score o f POHT men on the
AFQT was 13.6,12If curing “ignorance, idleness, and apathy” could not
be achieved on a volunteer basis, mandatory induction represented
the next best alternative. 47% of all NSM were drafted.13
As studies o f rejectees had indicated, most NSM came from
economically unstable homes with non-traditional family structures.
70% came from low-income backgrounds, and 60% came from single
parent families. Over 80% were high school dropouts, 40% read below
a sixth grade level, and 15% read below a fourth grade level. 50% had
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IQs o f less than 85.14
“Vietnam: Hot, Wet, and Muddy—Here’s the Place to Make a
Man!” enthused an advertisement placed by POHT recruiters in Hot
Rod Magazine. The Army and the Marines stressed glamor and
excitement, as well as training, as part of a soldier’s job, andm anym en
volunteered for dangerous assignments because recruiters made
them sound like adventures. SS targeted low-income ghetto areas—
particularly those where high concentrations of blacks lived—for their
advertising campaigns.
In Oakland, California during one year, POHT recruited 120
men from lower income groups, out of a total of 125 enlisted by SS.
90% of these recruits had placed in Category 4 or 5 (Category 4 men
were considered marginally qualified for service, and Category 5 men
were previously disqualified) ; most of them were black or Chicano
youths with police records.15 During the five years POHT lasted, an
average of 40% of NSM were black. This figure contrasted sharply with
the black 8% of the Service population. DOD certainly heeded
Moynihan’s call to overrepresent black men in the Armed Forces.
Project 100,000 took in 149,000 men during its first year—an
increase o f 9,000 over McNamara’s original projection. After that first
year, the Secretary of Defense told the public that “our Project 100,000
is succeeding beyond even our most hopeful expectations.” 16
All NSM entered regular basic training. 17,000 men took
remedial reading courses in order to achieve a fifth or sixth grade
reading level17; 6% took transition programs of educational or vocational
training.19After six weeks, the Armed Forces found 17% of the men
still unable to read at a fifth grade level.20Although these men had not
yet met the minimum literacy standards required by the service, they
were not recycled (sent back to take the course again). Instead, they
were assigned to basic combat training or special motivational platoons
for extra discipline. The Marine Corps had no remedial reading
program: "We are not impressed with the long term effects of a short
term remedial reading program,” said a Marine Corps general.21
In training courses other than remedial reading, POHTrecruits
confronted other difficulties. Continental Army Command (CONARC),
which conducted technical and other high level skills courses,
determined that the presence of NSM in many of these courses
hindered the progress of other students. CONARC recommended that
NSM be excluded from 64 of 237 entry level “advanced individual
training” (AIT) courses because slow learning and comprehension
abilities prohibited NSM from meeting academic course prerequisites.
In 1968 the Army decided to exclude NSM from 54 additional courses
because of the group’s previous poor performance and attrition rate.
The Army next revised course prerequisites for 37 more courses in
order to exclude NSM, before banning them from another 19 courses.
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John Grant was one example of a POHT recruit. With an IQ
of 66, he could not do simple arithmetic. At the age of 15 he
had married his pregnant wife, and the year Grant served in
the military, he went AWOL fifteen times. Kenny Matts was
another POHT recruit. Retarded as the result of a childhood
brain injury, Matts could not take notes or spell. After failing
the Armed Forces media training course, he went AWOL. Both
Grant and Matts joined the services because they were drawn
to its advertised programs for disadvantaged teenagers. Gus
Peters came from a broken home, left school after finishing
eighth grade, and was unemployed when he enlisted. Also in
poor physical condition, Peters had an IQ of 62. He scored in
the 10th percentile on the Armed Forces pre-enlistment
aptitude test, and later failed basic training due to poor
literacy skills17. Once in the service, Peters’ mental inabilities
prevented him from completing training as a tank driver.
Ridiculed by fellow soldiers, he went AW OL and was released
with an Undesirable Discharge after only six months in the
Armed Forces. Demoralized and without confidence, Peters
experienced much unpleasantness, and acquired no skills
during his short stint in the military.18

O f all AIT courses only five were restructured to accommodate POHT
recruits.22
Even in the five restructured courses— Marine Hull Repair,
Engineer Equipment, Wheel Vehicle Mechanic, Switchboard Operator,
Supplyman—the Army had problems with NSM. Instructors found
that NSM required more attention than other students, and more time
to absorb class material, during which more competent trainees
became bored. The Armed Forces was finding Project 100,000
increasingly time consuming and expensive.23
By April 1968 the service found only 68% of NSM eligible for
any A IT courses.24 Most NSM could not qualify for any advanced skills
or technical specialty training; many received “soft skill” or menial
jobs. The DOD, however, had another use for those NSM denied
training. Over 40% received combat-related assignments, and 37%
went to the infantry in Vietnam.25The high numbers of black combat
troops which POHT later brought to Vietnam added to disproportionate
black casualty numbers.
A 1969 study by the Comptroller General’s Office and the
Department of the Army cast doubt on McNamara’s initial assessment
of the progress of POHT. Though the report, titled “The Management
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of Project 100,000,” called the program “a marked success,” the
study’s conductors also publicized many negative results of POHT,
and issued a number of criticisms.
The Department of the Army study found major
problems with POHT training programs. NSM required enormous
amounts of remedial reading training, but could not receive it because
of the shortage of instructors and facilities. To remedy the situation,
the Army would have had to spend a great deal o f money and hire many
additional personnel. Men who came Into POHT under the medical
remedied program had an extremely high discharge rate. Many costs
associated with POHT, such as time costs and the cost of giving the
other men less attention, could not be estimated. The continuous
“recycling” (repetition of courses until NSM received a passing grade)
which many NSM required made the reporting system impractical and
deficient, since officers were reluctant and sometimes unable to
complete the many special POHT reports.
The GAO had several suggestions for reforming POHT, including
the recommendations that SS prevent the enlistment of men whose
mental conditions demanded more than six weeks of training, and
that local personnel be given adequate instructions for completing
POHT reports. In addition, the GAO suggested that the Armed Forces
establish reliable cost data for the training of NSM. The DOD accordingly
formulated new policies for POHT. Stipulating that those who failed to
meet minimum performance standards during or after training would
be released, DOD specified that during the initial training phase, NSM
would receive all the additional time they needed to complete the basic
course. DOD also instructed Armed Forces officers to constantly
monitor the individual and group progress o f POHT recruits. The
military establishment had gradually made impossible the realization
of McNamara’s initial promise of equal, specialized training and
valuable experience for NSM.
Throughout the program’s tenure, DOD supervisors reported
that 90% of the men received excellent ratings of conduct and
efficiency.26 The joint GAO-Army report, however, noted that faulty
and inaccurate recordkeeping cast doubt upon many of DOD’s claims.
Many members of the military establishment, especially those who
worked directly with NSM, openly criticized and disparaged the
program.27
Like the GAO and DOA, Armed Services officers found that
POHT men needed more time—and money— than regular soldiers.
Many NSM required remedial education, in addition to the basic skills
taught in boot camp. In order to achieve the minimum literacy and
skill levels required to advance, these men (frequently called “the
moron corps” by their military peers) often had to recycle. Many NSM

20 V ietnam G eneration
never passed some of the courses, no matter how many times they
recycled.
Officers complained that they had to “babysit" these men, who
sometimes could not master the most basic skills, such as brushing
their teeth.28 In an Army Times editorial, one Army officer expressed
the sentiment that the services, already preoccupied with fighting,
should not take on the war against poverty. The military did not have
the desire, the time, the money or the resources with which to assume
responsibility for such a program, regardless of the DOD’s professed
altruism.
At the heart of career officers' criticism of POHT was the feeling
that the military—especially during wartime— should not serve as a
social welfare program. Another Army Times editorial claimed that
past performances by rejectees showed that the Armed Forces could
only expect “poor mileage" from NSM. Many military men were aware
of the results o f an important study conducted by Eli Ginzburg, a
Columbia University professor. Ginzburg’s report. The Ineffective
Soldier, examined poor soldier performance in World W ar 2. His
conclusions should have caused readers of the Moynihan and Marshall
Commission reports to regard their conclusions as doubtful. Ginzburg's
results indicated that intelligence and education were important
qualities in good soldiers. In fact, his findings determined that high
school dropouts were five times as likely to perform poorly in battle
than college students, and three times more likely than high school
graduates.29
In 1969, troop numbers in Vietnam began to decrease as the
US de-escalated the Vietnam War. As the ceilings dropped, the
number of recruits in POHT fell. Although McNamara had originally
presented POHT as a social welfare program which would annually
recruit up to 150,000 men, the military evidently had no desire to
utilize these men in a peacetime army.
DOD cited several reasons for phasing out POHT. Revising
their earlier estimations, they claimed that the program had been
extremely expensive and not very successful. The Air Force, for
example, spent 14% of its budget on its 14% quota of NSM, and even
this was not enough, because 39% of their POHT recruits required
additional funding in order to recycle basic training.30Military officials
explained to the DOD at the 1970 House Appropriations Committee
hearings that de-escalation had reduced the numerical strength o f the
Armed Forces and that they had cut POHT numbers accordingly. They
reasoned that if they continued to enlist 100,000 Category 4 men every
year, these men would eventually constitute too large a percentage of
the total troops, and would downgrade overall military standards and
efficiency.
In 1970, SS set the POHT quota at 75,000. In 1971 it dropped
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the number to 50,000, and in 1972 the DOD officially terminated
Project 100.000.31 Even before the quota decreased, the Armed Forces
had independently begun to eliminate more men during basic training,
effectively restoring higher pre-Vietnam rejection rates. In 1968, the
Marines released 6.8% of all Category 4 recruits because o f mental
inability. In 1969 they rejected 10.5%, in 1970 33.9%, and in 1971
46.1%-32 Spurred by the career military’s opposition to POHT, the
Armed Services took the initiative in eliminating these men from their
ranks.
The military accepted some Category 4 troops until 1977, but
the DOD now asserts that the military can not serve as an appropriate
environment in which to rehabilitate the disadvantaged. Recent
legislation prohibits the use of mental group quotas in military
recruitment. Unfortunately, the military reached these conclusions
too late for many NSM.
Almost all Category 4 soldiers entered the services under
POHT. Their court-martial rate was 3% (as opposed to 1.4% for the
control group of other soldiers) while their rate for nonjudicial
punishments was 13.4% (as opposed to 8.2% for the control group).33
Studies showed that Category 4 soldiers were three times more likely
than other soldiers to go AWOL during basic training, twice as likely
to receive early discharges, and two-and-a-half times as likely to be
court-martialed.34 One third of NSM (approximately 360,000) were
discharged for absence or disciplinary offenses. Of these, 80,000 of
them received Dishonorable, Bad Conduct, or Undesirable Discharges,
and 100,000 of them received General Discharges.35 Some 36,000
POHT troops were killed, wounded, or dishonorably discharged before
serving their first eighteen months36.
While many NSM came home disabled, and many others died,
those who returned physically intact faced the same difficulties as
other Vietnam veterans in terms of employment, emotional and family
instability, and post traumatic stress disorders. Because a large
percentage o f NSM experienced combat, stress disorders may be even
more widespread in POHT veterans. The difficulty many veterans
faced in finding post-war employment was exacerbated in the cases of
the many POHT veterans who had received less than honorable
discharges. Deprived of promised training and education, these men
had little prospect of earning the doubled or tripled income which
McNamara had promised them.
Because McNamara insisted that the military avoid stigmatizing
these men, their records contained only cursory indications of their
status. This poor recordkeeping initially resulted in many NSM failing
to receive special training, and later receiving no special attention
from the Veterans Administration. The VA has repeatedly denied
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many benefits, even on appeal, to the numerous POHT men who
received less than honorable discharges.
McNamara also demanded that NSM should never be informed
of their unique status, so that they would not feel as if they were
government charity cases. The long-term result of this ignorance is a
group o f men who cannot fight for the special treatment they deserve
because they do not know who they are.
The injustices suffered by POHT veterans were intensified in
the cases o f black NSM. Since 40% ofPOHTm en were black, their post
war activities are included in various studies of black veterans. In
1969, when the Armed Forces released their first group of POHT
recruits, the unemployment rate for black veterans was 8.5% The rate
rose to 16% by 1971. Although unemployment rates among black
veterans dropped to 14%in 1972, during one month of that yearitw as
as high as 22%. In 1972, while the overall rate for black vets had
dropped to 11%, the rate among black veterans between the ages of 20
and 24 was 16.3%.37As 21 was the average age of NSM through POHTs
tenure, by 1973 most of them would fall in the 20 to 24 age group. It
seems likely, then, that POHT men contributed significantly to high
unemployment rates among black Vietnam veterans. Project 100,000
certainly failed to accomplish one of its primary stated goals: the
"uplifting" of black males.

BUcks ANd The MiliTARy
The US Commission on Civil Rights reported in 1963 that
“Negro servicemen believe on balance that the Armed Forces offer
them greater career opportunities than they can find in the civilian
economy.”38In a 1965 survey, 40% of the black men questioned listed
self-advancement as their reason for enlistment. Some all-volunteer
airborne divisions were 24% black.39 Until 1967, black reenlistment
rates for all service fields except communications and intelligence,
technical specialties, and medical and dental were between 47% and
49%-40 Observing these statistics, Moynihan viewed the military as “a
socializing experience for the poor... until their environment begins
turning out equal citizens.”41 But pre-1967 rates of black enlistment
and re-enlistment may not have been indications of black patriotism—
black men may have had few other available options.
Moynihan did not realize that for many black soldiers, the
“socializing experience" o f the Vietnam-era soldier would come in the
jungles and deltas of South east Asia. In 1963— the same year in which
the Commission on Civil Rights claimed that the military offered black
soldiers great advancement opportunities— 20% of all personnel
assigned to combat were black.42 Some black men volunteered for
combat in order to earn higher wages for high risk assignments. More
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frequently, however, the lower educational and technical skill level of
black enlistees and draftees led to infantry duty.
The disproportionately high number o f black men in combat
units translated into disproportionately high casualty and death
rates. While black Americans represented 11% of the population and
8% o f the military between 1961 and 1966, they comprised 16% of all
combat deaths in Vietnam. In 1965,23.5% of all Army personnel killed
in action were black.43 The DOD attributed unusually high black
casualty and death rates to the frequency with which black men
volunteered for elite combat forces like Airborne or the Green Berets,
but overlooked the fact that many of these men qualified for no
positions other than infantry duty. Between 1965 and 1970, blacks
comprised 9.3% of total active duty personnel in Vietnam, yet they
suffered 12.6% of the deaths. Black death rates exceeded by 35.5%
the rates for all servicemen, and exceeded by 30% the rates for those
men in Indochina.44
The National Advisory Commission on Selective Service found
large discrepancies between draft rates for blacks and whites. In 1966,
30.2% of blacks who joined the service were drafted, as opposed to only
18.8% of all whites. The Commission hypothesized that black men
were less likely to enlist because fewer of them were admitted into the
reserves and officer service programs. As a result, blacks comprised
a larger percentage of the draft pool. Commission figures confirmed
this lack of representation in the reserves, revealing that only 2.8% of
all nonwhites had any reserve duty experience, while 15.5% of gill
whites had some. An even more startling figure showed that only 0.2%
of all nonwhites, versus 3.3% of all whites, were admitted into officer
service programs.45Clearly, the equality and opportunity which many
ascribed to the Armed Forces was more illusion that reality.
The Commission’s report moved the DOD to instruct that
admission standards for the reserves be identical to those for regular
service. The reserves were a point of political controversy; critics
asserted that many college students and other potential deferees
enlisted in order to fulfill a patriotic duty and, at the same time, avoid
going to Vietnam. Anti-war protesters, who included civil rights
activists, college students, and others who felt the war was morally or
politically insupportable, claimed that the reserves served as a haven
from combat duty. In order to demonstrate the reserves’ exclusivity,
the protesters cited the minute percentage of black men in the
reserves, and compared that number to the high percentage o f black
men in combat. The DOD sent 3% o f the reserves to Vietnam to serve
as support troops in 1968, hoping to offset antiwar criticism, but the
nature of the reserves was not substantially altered. By the end of
1968, over 100,000 men had signed up forthe National Guard waiting
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list, and at that time only 1% of the reserve forces were black.46
Further investigation of Armed Forces’ policy toward black
Americans revealed that discrimination began even before these men
entered the service. The Armed Forces consistently rejected black men
at a higher rate than they rejected white men. Over half o f all blacks
failed to meet military standards: black males comprised 11% o f the
US population o f 18-21 year olds, and less than 5.5% o f these men
qualified for military service.
Both the AFQT, which determined mental fitness for service,
and the exam for deferment contained implicit biases towards whites.
In addition, if a black man passed the AFQT and wanted deferment for
educational reasons, he had to pass the draft deferment test. An
official from Science Research Associates (the company that lost the
bid for the draft deferment test design to Educational Testing Services)
claimed that “the test is culturally weighted to favor the white, middleclass and upper-class student, as are all tests of this type.”47
Representative Adam Clayton Powell of New York recognized
the test’s racial bias in 1966, predicting that
An excessively disproportionate number o f those falling
would be black students. The draft deferment test brings the
circle o f racial discrimination full cycle. First, we provide an
inferior education for black students. Next we give them a
series o f tests which many will flunk because o f an inferior
education. Then we pack these academic failures o ff to
Vietnam to be killed.48

Other critics of the m ilitaiy’s testing policies questioned the tests’
accuracy at determining standardized “dimensions of achievement
across different groups.”49 The draft deferment test qualified candidates
on the assumption that the highest scorers would be most successful
in their chosen career paths, although a 1964 Columbia University
study showed that academic achievers were more likely to attain lower
levels o f professional achievement.50The AFQT, critics claimed, failed
to measure “idealism, stamina, persistence, and creativity."51
L. Mendel Rivers, chair of theHouse Armed Services Committee,
commented on rising military manpower requirements, stating “The
Army is good for a man’s soul.”52 In 1965, 230,991 souls were
improved by the draft, and in 1966 their numbers rose to 331.000.53
Rivers’ view o f the Army as a reforming institution may have had some
effect on the decisions of local draft board members, who inducted a
startling percentage of qualified black men. Though 94.5% o f the men
who qualified for the draft were white, black men made up 8% of the
military overall— and 11% of the military personnel in Vietnam. The
black draft rate increased at a much faster rate than did the general
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draft rate. Although black citizens comprised 11% of the American
population, the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service
cited studies which showed that, o f qualified men, 30% of blacks (in
contrast to 18% of whites) were drafted.54
In 1967, the National Advisory Commission on Selective
Service revealed additional unbalanced induction figures for men with
military experience: 27% of white men and 42% of black men with
military experience were drafted.55Racial imbalances like these occurred
because of institutionalized policies of discrimination at the local
level— especially in southern states.
October 1966 figures show that only 1.3% of all local draft
board members were black. Seven states had no black draft board
members, including Mississippi, where 42% of the population was
black. Blacks were also unrepresented on draft boards in Alabama
(30% black population), Louisiana (31.9% black population), and
South Carolina (34.8% black population).56 The state Governor
appointed draft board members, who frequently lived in wealthy
districts far from their jurisdictions, and had little contact with
community members. Racial discrimination on some local boards
went further than a simple lack o f representation—the New Orleans
draft board had one member who had also served as the head of the
Ku Klux Klan.57
Most black leaders were acutely aware of the military's
discriminatory policies, and were incensed by Moynihan's suggestion
that the Armed Forces could improve the status of black men by
“socializing" them. To many, the idea that black men “deserved” larger
military participation seemed a transparent excuse for sending even
more black men to die in Vietnam. The white administration had
seemingly developed the perfect cover for a genocidal campaign
against black Americans. In his essay “Hell No, Black Men Won’t Go,"
Gayle Addison, Jr. recalled a World War 2 newspaper editorial which
he felt expressed the United States’ current intentions in Vietnam. The
Waterbury Times opined:
It seems a pity to waste good white men in battle with such
a foe. The cost o f sacrifice would be nearly equalized were the
job assigned to Negro troops...-. An army o f nearly a million
could probably be recruited from the Negroes o f this country
without drawing from its industrial strength or commercial
life....59

The complaints of black leaders were many and varied. The
money spent on the war and defense, some argued, could be better
spent to alleviate American domestic problems. Black men were
fighting to help Vietnamese secure freedoms which black citizens did
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not have at home In America. There was a strong sense that black
Americans were being robbed of their future, that the “talented tenth”
of black youth were being shipped off to die in Vietnam.60 Eldridge
Cleaver saw serious global repercussions to the black image:
It is no accident that the U.S. Government is sending all those
black troops to Vietnam. Some people think that Vietnam is
to kill off the cream o f black youth. But it has another
important result. By turning her black troops into the
butchers o f the Vietnamese people, America is spreading
hate against the black race throughout Asia.... Black
Americans are considered to be the world's greatest fools to
go to another country to fight for something they don’t have
for themselves.61

ONE-Thind o f a N a t io n : Rejectees ANd Awviy Policy
Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor and Chair of the President’s
Task Force on Manpower Conservation, opened the 1964 report One
Third o f a Nation with a letter lamenting the fact that “Fully a third of
the age group does not meet the required standards of health and
education. Far too many of these young men have missed out on the
American miracle.”62In the year of the report’s publication, 1,400,000
men turned 18. According to report estimates, one-third of them
would be disqualified, for some reason, from participation in the
Armed Services. The Task Force concluded:
O f persons who have recently failed the mental test... a major
proportion o f these young men are the products o f poverty.
They have inherited their situation from their parents, and
unless the cycle is broken, they will almost surely transmit
it to their children.63

The rejectee group of 1964 consisted of about 600,000 men,
and the correct conclusion that most of these men had grown up in
poverty was based on the similarity o f rejectees’ background
characteristics. Most of these men had little education: 40% of mental
rejectees had only completed elementary school, and 80% had not
finished high school.64 50% of the rejectees came from families with
annual incomes o f less than $4,000. and 20% came from households
with annual incomes under $2,000. 70% o f rejectees came from
homes with more than four children and 50% came from homes with
more than six children.65A 1963 poll published similar statistics: of
2500 rejectees, 30% had left school before the age o f 17 in order to
support themselves or their families. (Half of all rejected black men
cited this reason for leaving school.66) The 1963 poll revealed that 21%
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of the rejectees came from families who had received public aid during
the past five years; 14% of them presently received public aid. 31%
came from families in which the parents had divorced or separated,
and 9% of these men had court records.67
Investigations at the time of the poll determined that these men
had not escaped the poverty environment in which they had matured.
31% of rejectees were unemployed (a figure four times that of the
average 18 year old male), and those who did work held low-skill, lowpayingjobs.68Rejectees earned almost one-third less than the average
income of all those in their age group; they had an annual income of
$1,850 while their peers earned an average of $2,656 a year.69 Based
on these figures, the Task Force concluded that those who failed to
qualify for the Armed Forces had a high chance of failing in other areas
of life.
Altogether, including those disqualified for mental and physical
reasons, 49.8% of men tested in 1962 failed to meet Armed Forces
standards. O f those men who took the AFQT in 1962, 306,073 failed
the intelligence tests; “It was determined that they lacked the mental
equipment to be able to absorb military training within a reasonable
time. The most common deficiency was apparently that they could not
read or do simple arithmetic.”70
In addition to these depressing statistics, the report gathered
some hopeful figures. Of the 2500 rejectees polled in 1963, the
majority ofboth employed and unemployed men expressed a willingness
to obtain additional training and education, even if they had to leave
home to obtain it. The rate of willingness of black men greatly exceeded
that of whites, with 78% of working black men, and only 56% of white
men, desirous of more education. 85% of black men looking for work
wanted training and remedial education, while only 74% of their white
peers wanted these opportunities. Even among those not actively
seeking employment, 79% of blacks and only 59% of whites were ready
to leave home to receive training. A nationwide survey of rejectees
found 96% of nonwhites desirous of basic education and job training.71
The Task Force suggested that: “The President should
announce a Nationwide Manpower Conservation Program to provide
persons who fail to meet the qualifications for military service with the
needed education, training, health rehabilitation, and related services
that will enable them to become effective and self-supporting citizens.”72
Three years later, the Marshall Commission echoed the Task Force’s
call for national programs to help rejectees, but it gave the job of
manpower conservation to the Pentagon. While educational and
training programs for these men were included in the Task Forces’
initial recommendations, these programs were not the primary goal
of the Marshall Commission’s plan. Its goal had shifted from assisting
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rejectees to achieving “the objective, insofar as it proves practicable,
of accepting volunteers who do not meet induction standards but who
can be brought up to a level of usefulness as a soldier, even if this
requires special educational and training programs to be conducted
by the Armed Services. ”73
The National Advisory Commission report offered no less bleak
an image of American rejectees than its predecessor. Figures published
in 1965 showed that 62% of rejectees failed for physical and mental
reasons, while 38% failed because they were not judged to meet a
vague and flexible “moral”74 standard. Marshall Commission racebased statistics agreed with those of the earlier report: 49.7% of black
men and 24.7% of white men in the 26 to 2 9 y ea r old age bracket were
judged unfit for service.75 The National Advisory Commission report
also found that low income slum areas had the largest percentages of
rejectees and the least percentages of student deferments.76
The Marshall Commission generalized its conclusions, and
predicted that a man was likely to fail the AFQT if he had less than an
eighth grade education, or if he was a black high school dropout. The
report cited the fact that so many American men failed the AFQ T and
other minimum standards tests as a “national security risk” and
emphasized that unfitness was a result of “the years of their youth and
development, in conditions of poverty and discrimination, inadequate
education, and poor m edical facilities.”77 The Commission’s
investigations had begun months before McNamara made public his
plan for Project 100,000, but the report was released seven months
after the announcement. The report strongly supported the DOD’s
new program, claiming that it would train men and improve their
condition once they had entered the service.
The Commission tendered suggestions which directly
contradicted the conclusions of Ginzburg’s 1950 report. The Ineffective
Soldier—a report taken very seriously by the post-World War 2
military, and which had originally spurred the Armed Forces to adopt
the AFQT. The AFQT was designed to measure mental ability, and to
screen out men unable to acquire military skills. If a man scored in
the passing range on the 100 point test, and he qualified for no
deferments, he was ranked 1-A. Those who failed the test, but scored
between 10 and 30 received the ranking of 1-Y, and were placed in
Category 4. (Categories 1, 2, and 3 automatically qualified for service.
Category 4 was marginally qualified, and Category 5 was automatically
disqualified.) Most Category 4 men were disqualified from service
during periods of peace, since the Armed Forces could then afford to
be discriminating. During periods o f conflict, however, m en who had
received a 1-Y ranking had a good chance of being accepted by the
militaiy, since SS had to expand the pool of qualified men in order to

P roject 1 0 0 ,0 0 0

29

meet military manpower needs.
Historically, Armed Forces admission standards have fluctuated
with the manpower demands of wartime and peacetime. The AFQT
was designed as a measuring device; a way to classify men for military
induction. For example, during World War 2 and the Korean War,
when available men were scarce, the overall military rejection rates
were 30% and 37% respectively. During the peaceful period in the
early 1960s, before the US had committed its forces to Vietnam,
rejection rates rose from 49% in 1961 to 57.9% in 1964.78By December
1966, the preinduction rejection rate had dropped to 34%.79
During the late 1950s and early 1960s, the military made a
great effort to prevent the enlistment of men who could potentially
cause disciplinary problems, have psychiatric disorders, or might
otherwise fail to meet the Armed Forces’ rigorous mental and physical
demands. The number of men in the Armed Services with 5 to 8 years
of education dropped from 23.6% in 1953 to 10.8% in 1959, while the
percentage of men with 12 years of education rose from 35.3% to 53%.
Department of Defense officials explained the changes:
This raising o f intellectual standards can be regarded as an
important factor in decreasing non-effectiveness, since in the
past the prisoner group contained three times the proportion
o f individuals with an eighth grade or less education than the
general troop population. Also it is a reasonable assumption
that individuals with lower intellectual capability have greater
difficulty in adjustment than persons o f average intelligence
and thus more frequently become psychiatric problems or
disciplinary offenders.80

During this same period, the Armed Forces maintained a high rate of
less than honorable discharges, as it eliminated men who had
disciplinary problems and were not needed during peacetime. A study
by Army psychiatrists explained the rationale for these higher rejection
and discharge rates: “The smaller and cadre-type Army in peace time
has less opportunities for the utilization of marginal personnel.”81
1965 was the first year in more than a decade to see military
rejection rates fall. In this same year, many began to question the
validity of the AFQT. “Perhaps the m ilitaiy criteria for physical and
mental fitness,” conjectured one congressman, “is simply a more
convenient way for them to eliminate the numbers subject to the draft
which is in excess to their needs.”82Other critics expressed indignation
at the falling rates, insinuating that during times of low manpower
needs, the Armed Forces denied rehabilitation and training to men
with limited skills and physical ability, but during times of high need—
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wartime— these same men were inducted, enlisted, and hastily trained
for combat. When SS devised the 1-Y classification in 1962, General
Hershey defined 1-Ym en as “not too objectionable for war, not perfect
enough for 1-A in peacetime, but acceptable in an emergency.”83

CONClusiON
McNamara's goal when he founded POHT was to admit 40,000
former rejectees in 1966, and 100,000 more each year. More than
300.000 men joined the Armed Services as New Standards admittees
between 1966 and 1971.84Because most of these men could not attain
the skill level for special technical training, over 40% of them were
assigned to combat units, and in the Army and Marines, over 50% o f
them went to Vietnam.85 An estimated 10% of New Standards men
were killed, wounded, or dishonorably discharged in the first eighteen
months of their service.86 Although the whole premise of the Project
100.000 program was to provide education and training for these men,
only 7.5% of them received any remedial education and skills training.87
In 1971, because o f high costs, waning manpower needs, and deescalation in Vietnam, Project 100,000 ended.
Proj ect 100,000 assumed the gu ise of a social program with the
primary goal o f helping black youth and reconstructing “the fabric of
black society.”88In reality, the Johnson administration, the DOD, and
the Armed Forces used Project 100,000 to further their own agenda by
sending over 100,000 NSM (about 50,000 of them black) to fight and
die in Vietnam. The Administration had little time and money to devote
to the war against poverty and the campaign for civil rights. But by
adopting the paternalistic hypotheses of selected government reports,
Johnson and McNamara constructed the pretense of Project 100,000.
Not only would the program provide soldiers to produce the body
counts on which the Vietnam War focused, it would also temporarily
eliminate pressure on the administration to show its support for civil
rights.
The past and present discrimination experienced by blacks in
the military might have indicated that the Armed Forces were not the
Ideal environment in which to nurture a new generation of black men.
The Ginzburg study had revealed that rejectees would not be soldiers
of great potential and ability. And already, disproportionate numbers
of blackm en served, fought, and died in Vietnam (along with poor men
of all races). The Ineffective Soldier should have served as a warning to
the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service that if it
focused on the mentally and socially disadvantaged it would not find
a reasonable and ju st answer to the question “Who shall serve when
not all shall serve?”
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After PO H Ts inception, the DOD should have discerned that
the program would not be successful. Repeated cases of desertion,
disciplinary problems, mental incompetency, and physical incapacity
should have alerted the DOD to the fact that POHT was not an
overwhelming success. But as long as the Vietnam conflict required
troops, the Pentagon persevered in its insistence on the program’s
soundness.
Project 100,000 also played an important political role for the
Johnson Administration. By enlarging the pool of prospective draftees,
the Administration could continue the war in Vietnam without calling
in the reserves or drafting college students. Since college students
served as the voice for anti-war protest, POHT permitted Johnson to
avoid arousing increased protest from that group. NSM were neither
vocal nor politically inclined, and many of them welcomed the Armed
Forces’ guarantees of training, education, and excitement.
Project 100,00, although profitable to the Administration,
benefitted none of those whom it professed to help. As the Marines’
self-imposed release rate of POHT men and the antagonism on the part
of career officers illustrates, NSM were more often a nuisance than a
benefit to the military. Nor did most of the poor and uneducated
minorities recruited by the program come home better educated or
more self-confident. Black POHT veterans returned from Vietnam to
the same poor conditions as other Vietnam veterans.
By making the black family the scapegoat for America’s racial
problems, Moynihan had given the administration an excuse to send
unreasonably high numbers of black men to war. Moynihan’s theory
provided Johnson with a way to avoid implementing more practical,
useful, and fair methods for alleviating black poverty. Many of the
black families whom Moynihan claimed POHT would benefit had to
contend, during and after the war, with the grief of losing family
members, emotional traumas caused by combat, injuries,
unemployment, and social instability, in addition to the trials of
poverty and American racism. Project 100,000 did not help to solve the
problems of poor black Americans: it compounded old problems and
created new ones.

1
The basic foundation upon which this decision rested was the January
1964 report, One-Third o f a Nation: A Report on Young Men Found Unqualified
fo r Military Service, prepared by the Presidential Task Force on Manpower
Conservation, which was headed by Assistant Secretary o f Labor Daniel
Moynihan. The report stated that every year almost 600,000 young men, or
about one-third o f the 1.8 men eligible for service, were found “unfit" because
they failed the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). The report also found
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that a high proportion o f these men belonged to minority groups. In 1965,
DOD records reported that 56% o f all black men failed the AFQT. One Third
o f a Nation concluded that Black men failed the AFQ T primarily because they
suffered from educational disadvantages. This argument was logically extended
in the 1965 Moynihan Report on the black family. Assuming that poor
education and academic performance on the part o f many black men was only
a symptom o f a disturbance in “normal” family relations, the Moynihan Report
hypothesized that service in the Armed Forces represented the best way to
boost the self-esteem and confidence o f black men. Under a section headed
“The Armed Forces", the authors o f the 1965 report stated:
Service in the United States Armed Forces is the only experience
open to the Negro American in which he is truly treated as an
equal.... it is an utterly masculine world. Given the strains o f the
disorganized matrifocal family life in which so many Negro youth
come o f age, the Armed Forces are a drastic and desperately
needed change: a world away from women, a world run by strong
men o f unquestioned authority, where discipline, if harsh, is
nonetheless orderly and predictable, and where rewards, if
limited, are granted on the basis o f performance. The theme o f a
current Arm y recruiting message states it as clearly as can be: “In
the U.S. Arm y you get to know what it feels like to be a man."
[The President’s Task Force on Manpower Conservation. One Third ofa Nation:
A Report on Young Menfound Unqualifiedfor Military Service (Washington, DC:
US Government Printing Office) January 1964: 2. And, Office o f Policy
Planning and Research, US Dept, o f Labor, The Negro Family: The Case fo r
National Action (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office) March
1965.)
2
Lawrence M. Baskir & William A. Strauss. Chance & Circumstance: The
Draft, the War and the Vietnam Generation (New York: Vintage) 1978: 126.
3
Ibid.
4
Robert S. McNamara, “Social Inequities: Urban Racial Ils,” Vital Speeches
o f the Day, 34: 4(1967): 98.
5 At a planning conference for a study on black Americans, sponsored by
Daedalus and the American Academy o f Arts and Sciences, Moynihan made
known his opinions on the state o f black America: “I think the problem o f the
Negro family is practically the property o f the American government. I mean,
we spend most o f our money on this... in health, in welfare, and on
employment, and yet we know nothing about it.” [Rainwater, Lee & William L.
Yancey. The Moynihan Report & the Politics o f Controversy (Boston: MIT Press)
1967: 75.) In March 1965, Moynihan produced his controversial report. The
Negro Family: The Case fo r National Action. The report concluded that,
because o f a history o f discrimination and lack o f opportunity, the black
American family was deteriorating. This breakdown, said the report, resulted
from the fact that American society disempowered black American men, who
consequently could not support a typical patriarchal family. Moynihan, in
different sections o f the report, summarized the situation:
A t the heart o f the deterioration o f the fabric o f Negro society
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is the deterioration o f the Negro family. It is the fundamental
source o f the weakness o f the Negro community at the
present time.... In essence, the Negro community has been
forced into a matriarchal structure which, because it is so out
o f line with the rest o f American society, seriously retards the
progress o f the group as a whole, and imposes a crushing
burden on the Negro male and, in consequence, on a great
many Negro women as well.
The report documented the black family's “instability” by reporting high
fertility rates, incidences o f teenage pregnancy, welfare dependency rates,
divorce, separation, and desertion rates, and unemployment rates. Black
Americans, Moynihan explained, were trapped in a “tangle o f pathology”: high
crime rates, narcotics addiction, and alienation from white society. As a result
o f this “unsound” familial and social structure, black children, in Moynihan's
estimation, lacked proper role models and thus had no aspirations to rise in
American society. Moynihan contrasted black families with the typical white
family who, “despite many variants, remains a powerful agency... for
transmitting... valuable contracts o f the world o f education and work.”
When the Department o f Labor unofficially released the Moynihan Report
in 1965, both government officials and civil rights leaders hastened to criticize
it. Citing the report as incomplete and overdrawn, Bayard Rustin o f the A.
Philip Randolph Institute, Whitney Young o f the National Urban League,
Clarence Mitchell of the NAACP, and John Lewis o f SNCC criticized both the
report and Moynihan. The report, they complained, focused on socioeconomic
measures, and not antidiscrimination. Despite the expert status attributed to
him by the white political and social establishment, Moynihan had few
contacts with the black community or the civil rights movement. Furthermore,
he fit the stereotype o f the “white liberal", against which militant and
separatist groups such as the Black Muslims rebelled. Ignoring the criticisms
o f many black leaders, Johnson and McNamara embraced Moynihan's
conclusions.
The report suggested several solutions to the problem o f the black family,
including universal employment for all black men (which Moynihan proposed
could be achieved by placing black men into traditionally female jobs). He also
recommended housing and birth control programs. By focusing on statistics
and de-emphasizing the continuing impact o f economic and social
discrimination, Moynihan could maintain his narrow focus on the problems
o f the black family. Accordingly, he also suggested limited solutions.
Ultimately, his most influential and dangerous suggestion was that the
position o f the black male could be strengthened if he were offered greater
opportunities in the Armed Forces.
Moynihan’s focus on the Armed Forces as a solution to the problems o f the
black family was not coincidental. The year before the report on the black
family was issued, Moynihan helped lead the Task Force on Manpower
Conservation, which produced One Third o f a Nation. Service in the Armed
Forces, or “The American Miracle", as Task Force Chairman Willard Wirtz
referred to it, seemed to Moynihan an ideal solution to the poor education.
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employment prospects, and social status o f black men, and to the increasing
manpower needs o f the Vietnam conflict. In 1964, black Americans comprised
11% o f the population, but only 8% o f the military. Moynihan carried his
proposals further in his 1965 report, stating:
The ultimate mark o f inadequate preparation for life is the
failure rate on the Armed Forces mental test. A grown man
who cannot pass this test is in trouble. 56% o f Negroes fail it.
This is a rate almost four times that o f the whites.
Military service is disruptive in some respects. For those
comparatively few who are killed or wounded in combat or
otherwise, the personal sacrifice is inestimable. But on
balance, service in the Armed Forces over the past quartercentury has worked greatly to the advantage ofthose involved.
The training and experience o f military duty is unique; the
advantages that have generally followed... are singular, to
say the least.
Despite the fact that by 1966, the number o f black troops in Vietnam was
commensurate with their proportion o f the population, Moynihan believed so
adamantly in the advantages o f military service that he advocated even greater
black participation. The 1960s’ single most important psychological event in
race relations, he contended in a 1966 New Republic article,
was the appearance o f Negro fighting men on the T V screens
o f America. Acquiring a reputation for military valor is one o f
the oldest known routes to social equality.... Moreover, as
employment pure and simple, the armed forces have much to
offer men with the limited current options of, say. Southern
Negroes. By rights, Negroes are entitled to a larger share o f
employment in the armed forces and might well be demanding
one. (Rainwater 33-34)
[Office o f Policy Planning and Research, US Dept, o f Labor,
The Negro Family: The Casefo r National Action (Washington,
DC: US Government Printing Office) March 1965.] For an
extended discussion o f black responses to Moynihan, see
Rainwater and Yancey.
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Rainwater and Yancey's The Moynihan Report mentions POHT only as a by
product o f the study; they fail to attach any importance to it. Jean Carper’s
Bitter Greetings considers POHT as an example o f the draft's unfairness and
does not question McNamara and Moynihan’s belief that these men were
capable o f becoming good soldiers. Baskir and Strauss' Chance and
Circumstance contained the only in-depth assessment o f the motives behind
POHT. Interpretations critical o f the project are generally found only in books
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Enlistment Program) tried to provide remedial job training skills and job
referral services, with the goal o f raising rejectees to the educational skill level
o f normal soldiers. Ostensibly, they would receive training, get jobs, and also
meet military qualification standards. 134,000 men participated in Project
STEP, which proved a disappointment in three ways. First, o f 134,000 letters
written to prospective employers by the rejectee group, only 20% were
answered. Second, the program referred less than 4% o f the men for jobs;
2,200 men eventually got Jobs, while only 189 participated in job training
programs. Third, Congress refused to provide the $10 million which the
Pentagon requested to fund Project STEP. This program, which used the DOD
as a tool for implementing domestic social programs, marked the President’s
first attempt to use the military as a vehicle for his domestic policies. It would
not be the last time such an attempt failed. [Baskir: 125]
9 Jean Carper. Bitter Greetings: The Scandal o f the Military Drajt (New York:
Grossman) 1967: 158.
10 McNamara made this last requirement impossible to fulfill, however,
since he adamantly insisted that NSM should not be stigmatized by their
designation. NSM were never informed who they were, and a common service
number, which in 1967 became an alphabet code, was the only indication that
a recruit came from POHT. Nevertheless, poor physical or mental performance
generally made these men easy to identify. NSM came to be known by their
military peers as "the moron corps” and “McNamara’s idiots”.
11 Binkin, Martin & Mark Eitelberg. Blacks in the Military (Washington, DC:
Brookings Inst.) 1982: 34.
12 Ibid.: 90.
13 Ibid.: 34.
14 Baskin 129.
15 Ibid.: 128.
16 McNamara: 102.
17 Baskin 122-123.
18 Ibid: 127.
19 Ibid.
20 The Comptroller General of the United States. Management o f the Project
100,000 Program (Department o f the Army) December 1969: 6.
21 Paul Starr. The Discarded Army—Veterans After Vietnam: The Nader
Report on Vietnam Veterans and the Veterans Administration (Washington,
DC: Center for the Study o f Responsive Law) 1973: 195.
22 Comptroller General: 20.
23 Between 1968 and 1970 the costs for POHT more than doubled. In 1968,
the GAO estimated the cost for the entire program at $5.2 million. By 1969 the

56 V ietnam G eneration
cost grew to $11.2 million, and by 1970 it was $12.8 million. [Binkin: 128]
24 Comptroller General: 28.
25 Charles R. Figley & Seymour Leventman. Strangers at Home: Vietnam
Veterans Since the War lNew York: Praeger) 1980: 348.
26 Comptroller General: 16.
27 Baskin 126-127.
28 Figley: 349.
29 Baskin 123.
30 Starr: 195.
31 Baskin 130.
32 Starr: 196.
33 Starr: 195.
34 Baskir: 129.
35 Baskir: 129.
36 Figley: 348.
37 Starr: 201.
38 Report o f the National Advisory Commission: 26.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.: 161.
41 Baskir: 125.
42 Report o f the National Advisory Commission: 26.
43 Starr: 187.
44 Ibid.
45 Report o f the National Advisory Commission: 22.
46 Figley: 348.
47 Testing bias is also indicated by the fact that many black college students
failed the exam. The majority o f these students attended college in the deep
South, where most black colleges were located. In 1966, 32% o f all students
failed the draft deferment test in Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas:
47% failed in Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, and Tennessee. These figures
stand in marked contrast to the 7% failure rate for New England students, and
the 10% national rate. In its testing policies, the military failed to consider that
low academic performance might be a result o f differences in educational
opportunities, rather than low mental ability. Selective Service officials
admitted that the deferment test favored math and science students over
those in the liberal arts. Most black colleges at that time, emphasized neither
the sciences nor the liberal arts, how ever they trained students in technical
and trade skills, which were not included in the deferment test at all. The
Armed Forces also overlooked the racial, cultural, and economic discrimination
which existed within the educational system—discriminatory practices which
restricted black students from schools and programs which specialized in the
academic subjects privileged by the exams. [Carper : 76]
48 Ibid.: 89.
49 Ibid.: 77.
50 Binkin: 89.
51 C arp er 47.
52 Report o f the National Advisory Commission: 156.

P roject 1 0 0 ,0 0 0

77

Ibid.: 9.
Carper: 92.
Report o f the National Advisory Commission: 25.
Ibid.: 75.
Carper. 107.
Clyde Taylor, ed. Vietnam and Black America: An Anthology o f Protest and
Resistance (Garden City, NY: Anchor) 1973: 49.
59 Clyde Taylor’s Vietnam and Black America contains a collection o f essays
by noted civil rights leaders which detail the decisions o f some movement
leaders, and many movement followers to oppose Vietnam W ar policies.
Reasons for protest range from a concern with the future o f black Americans,
to a concern with national and international policy.
60 Ibid.: 278.
61 The President's Task Force: i.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.: 18.
65 Ibid.: 15.
66 Ibid.: 21.
67 Ibid.: 1.
68 Ibid.: appendix. One statistic shows that, although the average black
rejectee had 10 years o f schooling, and the average white rejectee had eight
years, white rejectees earned 40% more than their black peers.
69 bid.: A - l.
70 Ibid: 21.
71 Ibid: A -l.
72 Report o f the National Advisory Committee: 7.
73 The inclusion o f the "moral" category in these figures demonstrates an
interesting phenomenon: an overwhelming number o f black men were
rejected on the basis o f mental or moral inadequacy. The rate o f black
disqualification for physical reasons was actually lower than the regular
national average. [Report o f the National Advisory Committee: 22]
74 Ibid: 207.
75 Ibid: 22.
76 Ibid 58.
77 Carper: 150.
78 Baskin 124.
79 Albert G. Glass, et al., “The Current Status o f Arm y Psychiatry," The
American Journal o f Psychiatry, 117: 8 (February 1961): 682.
80 Ibid: 679.
81 Carpen 150.
82 Ibid: 39.
83 Figley: 348.
84 Baskin 129.
85 Figley: 348.
86 Starr: 194.
87 Rainwaten 51.
53
54
55
56
57
58

